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Measuring and Explaining the 
Electoral Fortunes of Small Parties  
in Taiwan’s Party Politics
DAFYDD FELL
Over the last two and a half decades the Kuomintang and Demo-
cratic Progressive Party have dominated Taiwan’s party system.  From 
2008-2012 they were the only parties represented in the Legislative Yuan.  
Nevertheless, there have been periods in which other parties have had a 
significant impact on the party system.  These parties have received con-
siderable media attention during and between campaigns, won significant 
numbers of parliamentary and local assembly seats, and affected the Tai-
wanese political agenda.  In this paper I assess the impact of these small 
parties on the party system and offer some explanations for their electoral 
successes and failures over the last decade.
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*   *   *
In 1986 when Taiwan was still under martial law, the then il-
legal Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨, DPP) challenged 
the ruling Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT) in that year’s National 
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Assembly election.  The election was pitting a tiny party only a few 
months old against a party that had been ruling Taiwan as a one party state 
for four decades and even today ranks among the richest in the world.  In 
1986 these two parties dominated the vote and seat shares in what was 
arguably Taiwan’s first multi-party election.  Over two and a half decades 
later the same two parties remained dominant in the most recent national 
parliamentary election in 2012, winning over 90 percent of the seats be-
tween them.  Therefore the party system has been much more stable than 
in many other Asian democracies, such as South Korea or Japan, which 
have seen significant changes in their main parties over the last two de-
cades.  Given this dominance it is not surprising that most of the literature 
on Taiwanese political parties has focused on the KMT and DPP.1
Nevertheless, there have been periods in which other smaller chal-
lenger parties have had an impact on the party system.  These parties have 
received considerable media attention during and between campaigns, 
have at times won significant numbers of parliamentary and local assem-
bly seats, and have affected the Taiwanese political agenda.  In this paper 
I track the electoral fortunes of these small parties and offer some expla-
nations for their electoral successes and failures over the last decade.
The literature on smaller parties in Taiwan has been quite limited. 
Christian Schafferer and John Copper both conducted studies on the im-
pact of small parties in the initial periods of multi–party politics from the 
late 1980s through to the mid 1990s.2  Later Dafydd Fell analyzed the 
period through to 2004 when small parties reached their peak levels of 
1For discussions on party system change in Taiwan see Ching-hsin Yu, “The Evolution of 
Party System in Taiwan, 1995-2004,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 40, no. 1-2 
(April 2005): 105-29; Dafydd Fell, “Interparty Competition in Taiwan: Towards a New 
Party System,” in Presidential Politics in Taiwan, ed. Steven Goldstein and Julian Chang 
(Norwalk, Conn.: Eastbridge, 2008), 49-84; Chiung-chu Lin, “The Evolution of Party Im-
ages and Party System in Taiwan, 1992-2004,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 23, 
no. 1 (2006): 27-46.
2Christian Schafferer, The Power of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election 
Campaigning in Taiwan (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003); John F. Copper, “The 
Role of Minor Political Parties in Taiwan,” World Affairs 155, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 95-
110.
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parliamentary seats.3  He also conducted an examination of the rise and 
fall of the first significant third party, the New Party (新黨, NP).4
This study attempts to track the changing influence of the challenger 
parties since 2004 and to test whether earlier explanatory frameworks 
are also valid in explaining their success and failure over the last decade. 
The next two sections discuss the debates over which labels are most ap- 
propriate for the non-mainstream political parties and which such parties 
are worthy of analysis in the Taiwan case.  The fourth section reviews 
the key phases in the development of smaller parties since the lifting of 
martial law.  This is followed by a discussion of the main approaches to 
explaining small party success in the literature on comparative politics 
and Taiwan.  Then the main analytical part of the paper considers the best 
theoretical approaches to explain the changing fortunes of Taiwanese 
smaller parties.  Since there are a number of publications looking at small 
parties up to 2004, my analysis focuses on explaining their development 
over the last decade.
Terminology for Non-mainstream Parties
An initial challenge in the study of parties taking on the mainstream 
parties is what to call them.  One option is to call these challengers new 
parties, in that they were officially registered after the first multi-party 
election of 1986.  One problem is that many of these parties are no longer 
new.  For instance, the New Party (NP) celebrated its 20th anniversary in 
2013.  In addition, there is much room for confusion as the NP has been 
3Dafydd Fell, “Success and Failure of New Parties in Taiwan,” China: An International 
Journal 3, no. 2 (September 2005): 212-39.
4Dafydd Fell, “The Rise and Decline of the New Party: Ideology, Resources and the Political 
Opportunity Structure,” East Asia 23, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 47-67.  The NP has attracted 
far more attention than the newer parties in the post 2000 period.  For instance, at least five 
books were published on the NP in the 1990s, compared to none specifically on the TSU 
or PFP.  An example of these books on the NP is Chien Ta, Huangqi mengsui (Yellow flag, 
broken dreams) (Taipei: Business Weekly).
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one of the most influential new parties in Taiwan.  Another popular con-
cept is to label them niche parties.  For Bonnie Meguid this refers to par-
ties that concentrate their appeal on new issue areas that are not part of the 
traditional economic left-right spectrum, while for others the distinction is 
based purely on party ideology.5  Thus for some authors communist, eco-
logical or regional nationalist parties would be viewed as niche parties.6 
However, neither variation of the niche party is especially useful in the 
Taiwan case, as the European left-right divide does not translate well into 
Taiwanese party politics, the Green Party Taiwan (台灣綠黨, GP) has had 
only a marginal influence so far, and the issue focus of the new parties has 
often overlapped with those of the mainstream parties.  In fact, at its peak, 
the NP attempted to present a very broad programmatic appeal, being the 
first party to issue manifesto style newspaper ads ahead of the two main-
stream parties.7  The term I have used in this paper is small parties, a label 
that Spoon adopts in her analysis of the survival of West European Green 
parties.8  This label fits quite well for the vast majority of challenger par-
ties in the Taiwan case.  However, for a number of years both the NP and 
People First Party (親民黨, PFP) at their peak could have been catego-
rized as medium-sized parties in terms of their levels of party identifica-
tion and parliamentary seats.
A useful distinction that can be made in the study of non-mainstream 
parties considers whether they focus on a set of new policy issues or 
concentrate on being more orthodox on core issue areas being neglected 
by a mainstream party.  Paul Lucardie suggests we can term the former 
prophetic parties, while Thomas Rochan calls the new issue parties, such 
5Bonnie Meguid, Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes 
in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6James Adams et al., “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? 
The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 
1976-1998,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (July 2006): 513-29.
7See NP ad, Lianhe bao (United Daily) (Taipei), November 18, 1995, 32.
8Jae-Jae Spoon, Political Survival of Small Parties in West Europe (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 2011).
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as environmental parties, mobilizers.9  By contrast, Lucardie terms the 
parties that appeal on traditional issue areas (especially on the left-right 
dimension) purifiers, something that Rochan calls challengers.10  Since 
the traditional core issue spectrum in Taiwan concerns the question of 
national identity, the best examples of purifiers have been the numerous 
splinter parties (such as the NP) that have broken away from the KMT 
or DPP since the mid 1990s.  A third category suggested by Lucardie is 
personal vehicles that are based principally on the appeal of their party 
founder or leader.  In Taiwan’s case a number of the newer parties have 
been so dominated by a single figure that they verge on inclusion in this 
category.  The most obvious cases are Chu Kao-cheng’s (朱高正) role 
in the Chinese Social Democratic Party (中華社民黨, CSDP) and James 
Soong (宋楚瑜) in the PFP.  A final variation on Lucardie’s framework is 
a category Allan Sikk terms “purifiers light” or “projects of newness.”11 
These are parties that focus on a similar range of issues to established par-
ties, are less ideologically motivated than purifiers, and as Sikk notes they 
do “not stand for much more than newness.”12  While Sikk pinpoints a 
number of Baltic State parties as falling into this project of newness type, 
it does also seem applicable to Taiwan’s PFP.
Which Parties to Analyse?
The next challenge then is which parties deserve attention?  Here 
the existing literature again shows divergence in approaches.  One option 
would be to concentrate just on niche parties which stress new issues such 
  9Paul Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence 
of New Parties,” Party Politics 6, no. 2 (2000): 175-85; Thomas Rochan, “Mobilizers 
versus Challengers: Towards a Theory of New Party Success,” International Political 
Science Review 6, no. 4 (October 1985): 419-39.
10Ibid.
11Allan Sikk, “Newness as a Winning Formula for New Political Parties,” Party Politics 18, 
no. 4 (2011): 465-86.
12Ibid., 467.
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as environmentalism.13  However, as we will see if we just focus on such 
parties the scope for analysis in the Taiwan case would be quite restricted. 
Moreover, environmental issues had already been widely debated by 
mainstream parties long before the first Green Party emerged in Taiwan. 
Robert Harmel and John Robertson propose including all registered par-
ties in the analysis.14  According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Interior there 
were 244 registered parties in June 2013.15  The majority of these have 
never contested elections, or won seats or significant vote shares.  Thus 
most of these parties cannot be considered relevant parties worthy of seri-
ous academic attention.  However, we need to consider what standards to 
apply for what constitutes a relevant party.  Kenneth Janda suggests, for 
instance, any party gaining over 5 percent in a national election, while 
Rochan prefers any party that has gained at least one parliamentary seat.16 
I have chosen to take a broad approach to what constitutes a relevant party 
by including all parties gaining at least 1 percent of votes at the national 
level, running more than a handful of candidates (ideally in more than a 
single election), and having a policy platform.  This approach allows us to 
analyze all serious attempts to challenge the mainstream parties but also 
to avoid getting bogged down with totally irrelevant party projects.
I have attempted to track the development of small parties in Tai-
wanese elections in tables 1-4.  These include the overall vote shares and 
seats won by mainstream and small parties in parliamentary elections 
(table 1), candidates nominated and elected from the main small parties 
in national parliamentary elections (table 2), vote and seat shares for rel-
evant small parties in national parliamentary elections (table 3), and vote 
13Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, “Ecology Parties in Western Europe,” West European Politics 
5, no. 1 (1982): 68-74.
14Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross 
National Analysis,” International Political Science Review 6, no. 4 (October 1985): 501-
23.
15For the list of parties, see the website of the Department of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Inte-
rior, http://www.moi.gov.tw/dca/02people_005-1.aspx?sn=10 (accessed June 26, 2013).
16Kenneth Janda, Political Parties: A Cross National Survey (New York: Free Press, 1980); 
Rochan, “Mobilizers versus Challengers,” 421.
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Table 2
Candidates Nominated and Elected by Small Parties in National Parliamentary 
Elections
1989 1991 1992 1995 1996 1998 2001 2004 2005 2008 2012
NP 45
(21)
83
(49)
51
(11)
42
(1)
1
(1)
(3) 10
(0)
7
(0)
PFP 89
(46)
65
(34)
(18) 3
(1)
28
(3)
TIP 20
(1)
3
(0)
4
(0)
(1)
TSU 55
(13)
40
(12)
(21) 28
(0)
10
(3)
LP 8
(0)
3
(0)
1
(0)
CSDP 58
(0)
25
(1)
GP 16
(1)
1
(0)
1
(0)
14
(0)
12
(0)
CPP (3)
NNA 12
(1)
Notes:
1. This table shows the number of candidates nominated and elected by small parties in 
national parliamentary elections.
2. Candidates elected are shown in the parentheses.
3. WP (勞動黨) 1989: 3 (0), 1991: 1 (0), 1992: 2 (0), 1995 2 (0), 1996: 2 (0).  In 2005 I did 
not include the single seat won by the Farmer’s Party, or the Civil Party’s single seat.
Sources: National Chengchi University, Election Study Center website http://vote.nccu.
edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp; Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan; Schaferrer, The Power of the Ballot 
Box.
and seat shares for small parties in Taipei and Kaohsiung city council 
elections (table 4).  The data for Taipei city council is worthy of attention 
as smaller parties have gained larger seat shares there than in national 
parliaments.  The tables reveal first that based on my standards laid out 
above eight parties are regarded as relevant small parties.  These are the 
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Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP), New Party (NP), Green Party 
Taiwan (GP), Taiwan Independence Party (建國黨, TIP), New Nation Al-
liance (新國家連線, NNA), People First Party (PFP), Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (台灣團結聯盟, TSU), and the Chinese People’s Party (中國民眾黨, 
CPP).  The one other party I have included in the tables is the Labor Party 
Table 3
The Vote and Seat Shares for Small Parties in National Parliamentary 
Elections
1989 1991 1992 1995 1996 1998 2001 2004 2005 2008 2012
NP 13
(12.8)
13.7
(14.7)
7.1
(4.9)
2.9
(0.4)
0.1
(0.4)
0.8
(1)
4
(0)
1.5
(0)
PFP 20.3
(20.4)
13.9
(15.1)
6.1
(6)
0
(0.9)
5.5
(2.7)
TIP 1.5
(0.4)
0.0
(0)
0.0
(0)
0.3
(0.3)
TSU 8.5
(5.8)
7.8
(5.3)
7
(7)
3.5
(0)
9
(2.7)
LP 0.92
(0)
0.1
(0)
0.4
(0)
CSDP 2.1
(0)
1.6
(0.6)
GP 1.1
(0.3)
0.1
(0)
0.0
(0)
0.6
(0)
1.7
(0)
CPP 1
(1)
NNA 1.6
(0.4)
Notes:
1. This table shows the vote share and seat shares for small parties in national parliamentary 
elections.
2. Seat shares are shown in the parentheses.
Sources: National Chengchi University, Election Study Center website http://vote.nccu 
.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp; Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan; Schaferrer, The Power of the 
Ballot Box.
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(工黨, LP).  In 1989 it won 0.9 percent of the vote, contested three elec-
tions, had a Legislator and Kaohsiung city councilor, and was a serious 
candidate in a number of districts.17  Some readers may be asking why I 
17It should be noted though that its sole legislator Wang I-hsiung (王義雄) had been elected 
for the DPP in 1986 and defected when he formed the LP.  He then failed in his bid for 
re-election under the LP label in 1989.
Table 4
Vote and Seat Shares for Small Parties in Taipei (TPE) and Kaohsiung (KH) 
City Council Elections
1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
KH TPE KH TPE KH TPE KH TPE KH  TP KH TP
NP 4.8
(4.6)
21.7
(21.2)
3.8
(2.3)
18.6
(17.3)
0.6
(0)
9.0
(9.8)
0.03
(0)
5.9
(7.7)
0.09
(0)
5.2
(3.8)
PFP 11.9
(15.9)
17.6
(15.7)
6.8
(9.1)
7
(3.8)
2
(1.5)
4.6
(3.2)
TSU 6.7
(4.6)
3.7
(0)
5.7
(2.2)
5.2
(3.8)
1.7
(0)
2.6
(1.6)
GP 1.5
(0)
0.1
(0)
0.4
(0)
1.2
(0)
TIP 1.9
(0)
0.7
(0)
LP (2.3) (0)
NNA 1.9
(0)
Note:
1. This table shows the vote and seat shares received by small parties in Kaohsiung and 
Taipei City Council elections.
2. The seat shares are shown in the parentheses.
3. Data are missing for the Labor Party’s (LP) vote share in 1989.
4. Kaohsiung city figures in 2010 are for the newly enlarged Kaohsiung City, and thus 
include districts previously in Kaohsiung County.
Sources: National Chengchi University, Election Study Center website http://vote.nccu 
.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp; Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan; Schaferrer, The Power of the 
Ballot Box; Martin Lasater, A Step toward Democracy: The December 1989 Elections in 
Taiwan, Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1990).
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did not include the Non Partisan Alliance (無黨團結聯盟), which at least 
statistically has been quite successful.18  However, this grouping lacks any 
real party platform and is essentially a personal vehicle for pro KMT poli-
ticians that the KMT prefers not to nominate.19  However, since my study 
concentrates on the post 2004 period the explanatory analysis will focus 
on the NP, TSU, PFP and GP.
Phases of Small Party Electoral Development
Tables 1-4 reveal that we can divide the electoral fortunes of the 
small parties into four or potentially five broad phases.  Following the le-
galization of new parties in 1989 a large number of parties were registered 
and began contesting elections.  However, the main challenger parties in 
the initial period were leftist parties such as the LP, CSDP, and Worker’s 
Party (勞工黨, WP).  Although many of the newly formed parties estab-
lished after the lifting of martial law were formed around ideas of Chinese 
nationalism, and could be viewed as KMT purifiers, it was the leftist 
prophetic parties that had the greater impact.  These parties did nominate 
significant numbers of candidates and received significant press attention 
in elections between 1989 and 1992.  Nevertheless they were unable to 
make the critical breakthrough, with only two successful candidates.  After 
1992 these leftist parties largely disappeared as electoral forces.20
The next phase lasts for the remainder of the 1990s through until the 
2000 presidential campaign.  This time the major small parties were par-
ties that had split off from the two mainstream parties partly as a result of 
dissatisfaction with their moderation on core ideological issues.  Thus this 
is a period of purifier parties dominating the scene.  The only exception to 
18In 1998 a similar grouping adopted the name Democratic Alliance (民主聯盟).
19Although the KMT is often prepared to cooperate with these politicians in elections and 
in parliament, it is reluctant to officially nominate them.
20One exception is the election of the first WP candidate Kao Wei-kai (高偉凱) in Hsinchu 
County Council in 2009.
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this pattern was the emergence of the GP, which managed to win a seat in 
the 1996 National Assembly election and a 1 percent vote share in its first 
year after formation.  A key feature of this period is how the small parties, 
particularly the NP, had a much greater impact than in the first period.  The 
NP won vote and seat shares of around 13 percent in the mid-1990s and in 
fact was seen as performing unexpectedly well in the 1995 Legislative elec- 
tion.21  In its stronghold of Taipei city council the NP managed to gain ap- 
proximately 20 percent of seats and votes.  If we think in comparative terms, 
the NP was winning a slightly lower national vote share than Britain’s third 
party, the Liberal Democrats, and a much higher seat share.  It also accrued 
significant media attention and had a major impact on the political agenda. 
The passion at its rallies was second to none except for perhaps the DPP’s. 
In the mid 1990s two Taiwanese nationalist parties split off from the DPP, 
these being the Taiwan Independence Party (TIP) and the New Nation Al-
liance (NNA).  However, both only won a single parliamentary seat and 
their main impact was to divide the pro DPP vote in 1998.
The 2000 presidential election marks the start of the third period. 
The election was won by the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), while the 
runner up was a rebel KMT candidate James Soong.  In the aftermath 
of Soong’s narrowly unsuccessful campaign, he formed the PFP.  He 
recruited politicians from both the KMT and NP that had supported his 
presidential campaign.  The new era became apparent in the ultimately 
aborted National Assembly of May 2000 when the PFP nominated more 
extensively than any previous small party.22  Similarly, another small party 
emerged on the Taiwanese nationalist side of Taiwan’s politics called the 
TSU.  This recruited mainly from politicians close to the former president 
Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) in the KMT and also some DPP politicians.  The 
new era was confirmed in the 2001 legislative elections where the 1990s 
era splinter parties disappeared failing to win seats, while in contrast the 
21Dafydd Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan (London: Routledge, 2005), 14.
22“National Assembly Election: 263 Register Yesterday,” Lianhe bao (United News) (Taipei), 
April 14, 2000, 4.
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PFP and TSU gained almost a third of the seats.  The PFP and the TSU 
also made breakthroughs in the Kaohsiung and Taipei city councils a year 
later.  In Taipei the NP remained important, winning almost 10 percent 
of seats and votes in 2002.  In fact, it even looked possible that the PFP 
could replace the KMT as the biggest challenger to the DPP, as its party 
identification figures exceeded the KMT’s in 2001 and 2002.23  Although 
the TSU and PFP suffered some loss of support in the 2004 parliamentary 
elections, they remained relevant parties, especially considering that there 
was a hung parliament from 2001-2008.  With no party holding an overall 
majority, the small parties played an important role in supporting their 
allied mainstream parties.  In terms of parties winning seats, the 2005 Na-
tional Assembly election ranks as having the most diverse outcome, with 
five small parties winning seats.  Thus this period from 2000-2005 repre-
sents the highpoint in Taiwan’s multi-party scene.
The fourth phase’s start point is debatable.  Support for the third par-
ties had been in decline since 2003 but it became especially apparent in 
late 2006 as PFP and TSU politicians began defecting in large numbers 
back to the mainstream parties.  Then in 2008 the small parties were al-
most completely wiped out in the legislative elections.24  The declining 
support for small parties had been visible in the 2006 city council elec-
tions and this pattern continued into 2010.  That election left just one PFP 
city councillor in Kaohsiung and six small party city councillors in Taipei 
(3 NP, 2 PFP and 1 TSU).
It is unclear whether we are now witnessing a new phase of revived 
small parties in the light of the 2012 national elections.  In that year the 
PFP and TSU both managed to win three seats, with the TSU’s nine percent 
vote share in the proportional representation (PR) party list vote being 
23The party identification figures for the PFP in 2001 were 18.9 percent and in 2002 were 
15.9 percent.  By contrast, the figures for the KMT were 14.8 percent in 2001 and 14.4 
percent in 2002.  See Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Trends in 
Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese,” http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/ti-
nyd2/content/partyID.htm.
24The only successful small party candidate was Lin Cheng-er (林正二) who stood in the 
Plains Aboriginal district.
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especially noteworthy.25  Although the GP was unable to win any seats, 
it continued its gradual improvement with 1.7 percent of the vote share, 
coming fifth ahead of the NP for the first time.  This represents its highest 
vote share and only the second highest vote share for a prophetic party.26 
In short, 2012 suggests a potential revival of small parties, but the test 
of whether this was a one off or a trend setting election will come in the 
2014 city and county council elections.  2014 will be especially signifi-
cant as it will be the first time all city and county council elections have 
been held in the same year.27
Explaining Small Party Success
Comparative politics has developed a number of perspectives on 
how to best explain the impact of smaller parties.  One approach is to ex-
amine sociological variables to determine the impact of smaller parties. 
Here the link is made between the salience of challenger parties’ favored 
issues and their electoral impact.  For instance, studies have tried to link 
the salience of immigration issues together with levels of unemployment 
with the rise of far right parties in Europe.28  Similarly, Robert Inglehart 
and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel have argued there is a positive correla-
tion between higher levels of post-materialism in society and green party 
success.29  These approaches do have some value in the Taiwanese case, 
25Less than a year after the 2012 election, the PFP was reduced to 2 legislators after Lin 
Cheng-er again had his legislator status cancelled as a result of a political corruption case. 
This took the PFP below the minimum number of legislators (3) for a legislative caucus.
26The highest remains the 2.1 percent for the SDP in 1991.
27Previously Taipei and Kaohsiung City Council elections had been held a year after those 
held in the other cities and counties.
28Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz, “Globalization, the Welfare State and Right Wing 
Populism in Western Europe,” Socio-Economic Review 1, no. 2 (2003): 215-45.
29Robert Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1997); Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, “The New Challengers: Explaining the 
Success of Green and Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe,” in Les Petits Partis, 
ed. Annie Laurent and Bruno Villalba (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 119-41.
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as the high salience of national identity issues does partly explain the 
relative success of identity oriented purifier parties such as the NP and 
TSU.  Similarly, ethnicity has played a role as Mainlanders have held a 
dominant position in the two most successful small parties (NP and PFP) 
and Mainlanders made up a high proportion of their grassroots support. 
However, this cannot tell us the whole story as it fails to explain why the 
KMT’s splinter parties have been far more successful than those on the 
pro DPP side.  If sociological explanations were decisive we would ex-
pect the opposite outcome, especially considering the progressive decline 
in Chinese identity and support for unification among Taiwanese voters.30 
This approach also cannot explain why environmental parties struggled to 
get off the ground in Taiwan despite the moderately high salience of envi-
ronmental issues.
One of the most popular explanations that have been applied to 
examinations of party systems has been institutional.  These studies rep-
resent an extension of the work on the consequences of electoral systems 
first developed by Maurice Duverger.31  Thus smaller parties are less like-
ly to emerge as relevant parties in single member district (SMD) or first 
past the post (FPTP) electoral systems that tend to feature two party com-
petition.  By contrast, third parties should enjoy greater space in propor-
tional representation (PR) systems.  This impact can be seen in the case of 
the Green Party in the United Kingdom.  The Green Party only gained its 
first seat after decades of struggle in the FPTP House of Commons elec-
tions in 2010 but it has managed to win seats in the proportional European 
Parliament electoral contests.  This approach is important for the Taiwan 
case as the above tables reveal how small parties have won seats in the 
parliamentary and local council seats which use(d) a semi-proportional 
single non transferable vote with multi-member districts (MMD) electoral 
30For the key identity trends, see National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, 
“Trends in Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese,”  http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/
modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=6.
31Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(London: Methuen, 1954).
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system.  By contrast, small parties have made far fewer inroads into the 
SMD contests for executive posts and or the presidency.  The fact that 
Taiwan moved to a new predominantly SMD electoral system after 2005 
allows us to test this approach in the subsequent parliamentary elections 
of 2008 and 2012.
Bonnie Meguid has been critical of both sociological and institu-
tional explanations of small party success.32  She suggests that instead 
mainstream party strategies are critical to explaining the impact of niche 
parties.  She argues that mainstream parties can adopt dismissive, accom-
modative or adversarial strategies on the niche parties’ core issue.  Un-
der this theory the first two approaches tend to undermine the impact of 
smaller parties, as while dismissive strategies decrease the issue salience, 
accommodative strategies will enable the mainstream party to steal the 
ownership of the niche party’s issue.  The ideal scenario for small par-
ties is where mainstream parties take adversarial approaches towards the 
smaller parties’ core issues.  This, according to Meguid, will favor the 
niche party as it will not only raise the salience of the core issue but also 
reinforce its ownership over the issue.
A hybrid approach to explaining small party success was developed 
by Paul Lucardie to examine the case of the GP in the Netherlands.  He 
proposed a comprehensive framework in which small party success or 
failure can be explained by three factors: (1) a political project that ad-
dresses problems considered important by much of the electorate, (2) 
sufficient resources, and (3) the political opportunity structure.33  In 
other words, small party success depends on their ability to propagate a 
clear and distinct party appeal that addresses salient political issues; their 
human, financial, organizational, and media resources; and the ability to 
take advantage of their electoral environment.
This framework has been employed to explain the impact of third 
parties in Taiwan in the period from the late 1980s through to 2004 by 
32Meguid, Party Competition between Unequals, 6-13.
33Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 175-85.
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Fell.34  He showed how the NP was able to expand its vote share by com-
bining its anti-Taiwan independence and pro Mainlander ethnic rhetoric 
with popular appeals such as exposing KMT corruption, a five day work-
ing week and calls for cross-Strait peace and closer economic ties with 
China.  At the same time it benefitted from rich human resources, as so 
many of its founding politicians had extensive government and election 
experience in the KMT.  Such politicians were able to also raise the finan-
cial resources so critical to Taiwanese campaigns.  In addition, the NP was 
able to benefit from the favorable political environment.  For instance, 
it focused on the semi-proportional MMD electoral system used for par-
liamentary and local council elections.  However, it also emerged at the 
time when the KMT was in decline organizationally, was suffering from a 
worsening party image and was moving away from core issue positions. 
Thus the NP was able to poach both voters and politicians from its origi-
nal party.
A final way of understanding the impact of small parties in the litera- 
ture is to focus on small party agency.  Spoon argues that small parties can 
survive even in inhospitable institutional contexts if they can get the right 
balance between the sometimes conflicting goals of maintaining their 
core party ideals and the needs of vote or seat maximization.35  Using the 
cases of French and British Green Parties, she shows how the French GP 
was comparatively more successful at balancing these goals and thus had 
a greater political impact.
Explaining the Third Parties’ Strong Showing in 2005
Since this paper focuses on the fortunes of small parties after 2004, 
the first trend we need to explain is their strong performance in the 2005 
National Assembly election.  The election was noteworthy in that five 
34Fell, “The Rise and Decline of the New Party,” 47-67.
35Spoon, Political Survival.
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small parties won National Assembly seats.  In addition to the TSU and 
PFP, smaller parties from the 1990s such as the NP and TIP, as well as 
for the first time the Chinese People’s Party (中國民眾黨, CPP) had won 
seats.36
Nevertheless, this election should not be taken as an especially sig-
nificant landmark in the development of small parties.  There was a re-
cord low turnout of only 23.4 percent, reflecting low voter interest in the 
election.37  Moreover, this was the final National Assembly election, as 
after voting on a constitutional reform package the body was effectively 
abolished.  The institutional approach offers the key to understanding the 
diversity in the outcome, as this election used a pure proportional system, 
with a single nationwide district.  Moreover by comparing the PFP’s vote 
share in December 2004’s legislative election (13.9) with May 2005’s Na-
tional Assembly contest (6.1), the halving of the party’s vote share reveals 
it was in serious decline.  Its party identification levels were also col-
lapsing by 2005, as it fell from almost 10 percent in 2004 to 4 percent in 
2005.38  It is even quite possible that most of the 1 percent who voted for 
the CPP did so as a result of confusing it with the KMT, as they have very 
similar Chinese names.  In short, the 2005 National Assembly elections 
represent a false dawn for small parties.
Explaining the Clear Decline 2006-2010
Our next task then is to explain the lengthy period of obvious small 
party decline between 2006 and 2010.  The common explanation is to 
look at the mechanical effects of the new SMD electoral system that was 
36Additionally the Farmer’s Party and Citizen’s Party each won a single seat.
37Central Election Commission database, 2005 National Assembly results, http://db.cec 
.gov.tw/histMain.jsp?voteSel=20050501A9.
38See Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Trends in Core Political Atti-
tudes among Taiwanese,” http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/partyID 
.htm.
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first used in 2008.39  Undoubtedly, the new system did have a negative 
effect, squeezing the space for smaller parties.  The new system meant 
that in most districts there could only be one competitive candidate on the 
Blue and Green sides, as a second candidate on either side would split the 
vote and potentially allow the rival party to win.  This encouraged voters 
to concentrate their votes on their preferred mainstream party candidates 
and served to push incumbent small party politicians to defect to the 
mainstream parties.  Nevertheless, as Spoon has shown, smaller parties 
can survive hostile institutional settings.  In 2005 the PFP still had a large 
number of politicians with district electoral strength, while the TSU had 
polled 8 percent in multiple elections (2001 and 2004), and thus both had 
the potential to remain a relevant party even under the new electoral sys-
tem.  Moreover, if the electoral system alone was the decisive factor, why 
then did the small parties re-emerge in 2012 under the same unfavorable 
system?
Instead I argue that the decline in the small parties through to 2010 
is best explained with reference to the interrelationship between the small 
parties and their mainstream partner parties.  In other words, understand-
ing this fall incorporates elements of Meguid’s mainstream party strate-
gies and Spoon’s small party agency approach.
After the PFP was created in 2000 it was quite successful at creat-
ing a distinct party image based around the reputation of its leader James 
Soong.  Soong had been able to attract a large number of politicians with 
genuine electoral experience and strength.40  The party also chose to take 
a relatively moderate line on policy matters compared to its predecessor 
KMT splinter party, the NP.  In fact, beyond its image as being the party 
of a competent governing team, the PFP often chose to appear highly 
ambiguous on policy matters.  In its first three years, the PFP also worked 
39For instance see, Hans Stockton, “How Rules Matter: Electoral Reform in Taiwan,” Social 
Science Quarterly 91, no. 1 (March 2010): 21-41; Chung-li Wu, “A Simple Model for Pre-
dicting the Outcome of the 2008 Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan,” Issues & Studies 
44, no. 4 (December 2008): 1-28.
40For instance, numerous PFP’s legislative candidates in 2001 were incumbent legislators 
originally elected under KMT or NP banners.
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on developing its brand image as the orange party, with the colour and 
fruit consistently used in its advertising.41  By contrast, the KMT was still 
recovering from its disastrous defeat in 2000 and struggled to compete 
with its new rival.  The success the PFP initially had is reflected in its fine 
election performance in 2001 and 2002 and in how it exceeded the KMT’s 
party identification level in those two years.42  If the PFP had retained its 
independent strategy in 2004, it probably would have led to a repeat of 
the 2000 election, but it could well have allowed the PFP to replace the 
KMT as the second largest party and dominant party on the Blue wing of 
Taiwanese politics.43
However, the roots of the PFP’s decline lay in its peak period and 
the increasingly intimate working relations it developed with the KMT. 
As early as late 2000 the two parties began working closely together in 
parliament to block the DPP government’s policy agenda.  For example, 
it cooperated closely with the KMT over the bid to force the DPP gov-
ernment to resume construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power station in 
2001.44  They began limited cooperation on election nomination in some 
seats in 2001 and expanded this in 2002.45  Increasingly, analysts talked 
of the KMT, PFP and NP as a Pan Blue block rather than separate parties. 
This process culminated in the decision to run a joint ticket for the 2004 
presidential election with the KMT chair as the presidential candidate and 
41See PFP ad, Lianhe bao (United Daily) (Taipei), November 21, 2001, 12.
42See Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Trends in Core Political Atti-
tudes among Taiwanese,” http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/partyID 
.htm.
43Since 2000 it has been common to distinguish between Blue and Green in Taiwanese 
politics.  These are the two main colours in the KMT and DPP party flags respectively. 
Thus parties seen as being in the Blue camp are the KMT, PFP, and NP, while the DPP, 
TSU, TIP and NNA can be categorized as Green parties.
44For discussion of the Fourth Nuclear Power Station dispute see Linda Arrigo and Gaia 
Puleston, “The Environmental Movement after 2000,” in What Has Changed? Taiwan 
Before and After the Change in Ruling Parties, ed. Dafydd Fell, Henning Klöter, and 
Chang Bi-yu (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 176-80.
45For instance, the KMT, PFP and NP jointly campaigned for Wang Chien-hsuan in the Taipei 
County mayoral election in 2001 and these three parties supported the KMT candidate 
Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election as Taipei mayor in 2002.
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the PFP’s Soong as his running mate.  The PFP was largely invisible in 
this campaign and this marginalization made it appear the PFP had been 
taken over by the KMT.  A sign of this pattern was the growing talk of a 
KMT-PFP merger after the 2004 presidential defeat through into 2005.46
The blurring of the distinctions between the KMT and PFP acceler-
ated into the second DPP term (2004-2008).  The two parties worked to-
gether closely to repeatedly block the DPP executive’s legislative agenda. 
For example, they prevented discussion of the DPP’s US arms procure-
ment bill from reaching the legislative floor numerous times, delayed 
approval of the 2007 central budget until after the start of the fiscal year, 
and by refusing to approve the president’s Control Yuan nominees, left 
the body dormant for three years.47  At times the two parties cooperated to 
impose legislation on the DPP executive, such as the regulations for nom-
ination of members on the National Communications Commission and 
the Central Election Commission, and by establishing a Truth Committee 
to investigate the March 19, 2004 assassination incident.48  When KMT 
Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) made his groundbreaking visit to China in 
April 2005, PFP Chair Soong followed suit one month later.
Following the Pan Blues narrow presidential defeat in 2004, there 
were a series of demonstrations protesting against the legitimacy of the 
result.  PFP politicians were especially visible in these protests, many 
of which turned violent.  For example, PFP legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅) at-
tempted to smash through the gates of the Kaohsiung District Court with 
a campaign truck and Soong famously called on supporters to storm the 
presidential palace.  Both these incidents were subsequently used in DPP 
election ads to accuse the Pan Blues of creating political instability.  Such 
46For a discussion of this issue see Da-Chi Liao, “‘Guo’ yu ‘Qin’ de fen yu he: lixing yu 
ganxing de bahe” (The unification or separation between the KMT and PFP: a tug of war 
between affection and rationality), Taiwan minzhu jikan (Taiwan Democracy Quarterly) 
(Taipei) 1, no. 3 (September 2004): 203-11.
47Ko Shu-ling, “Same Old Tune: KMT Blocks Arms Bill,” Taipei Times, September 7, 2005, 
1; “PFP, KMT Plan to Push Legislation Through,” Taipei Times, February 27, 2007, 3.
48Chang Yun-ping, “‘Truth Committee’ Statue Goes Too Far, DPP Says,” Taipei Times, August 
25, 2004, 3.
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incidents served to undermine the PFP’s reputation as a moderate party, 
replacing it with a violent and radical image.  By contrast, though the 
KMT had led the 2004 campaign, a number of its key figures such as Ma 
Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) took a more cautious 
line on the protests.
When the PFP did try to highlight its independent positions, these 
attempts tended to be short-lived and thus less convincing.  For instance, 
in February 2005 Soong and Chen met and reached a ten point agreement 
on a range of issues.49  However, trust quickly broke down as only weeks 
later he announced he would follow Lien in a PRC visit.  There was also 
occasional talk of the PFP cooperating with the DPP over legislation deal-
ing with KMT party assets.50  However, these never materialised into ef-
fective legislative voting.  Lastly, in 2006 Soong stood against the official 
KMT candidate for Taipei mayor.  Once again this was not effective as he 
did not stand on a PFP ticket and this was just one isolated case and both 
before and after the election the PFP-KMT legislative cooperation continued 
unabated.  In other words, the PFP had increasingly lost its distinctive 
party image.
In addition to working together on a range of policy areas, the two 
parties enhanced their nomination cooperation after 2004.  However, the 
process moved from cooperation to a more predatory approach by the 
KMT in which it increasingly took over the PFP’s most prized assets, its 
legislators.  The model was set in 2005 when a number of PFP politicians 
returned to the KMT to join its primaries for the local executive elec-
tions.  In fact, in Taipei County a PFP legislator Chou Hsi-wei (周錫瑋) 
won the KMT’s primary and the subsequent county magistrate election. 
This poaching of PFP politicians strangely did not damage the PFP-KMT 
relationship and once the precedent had been set there was a wave of 
defections in 2006-7 to join the KMT’s legislative primaries for the 2008 
49Caroline Hong and Huang Tai-lin, “Chen, Soong Sign 10-Point Consensus,” Taipei Times, 
February 25, 2005, 1.
50“DPP Pessimistic on PFP Cooperation on Assets Law,” Taipei Times, December 21, 2004, 
3.
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elections.51  In the spring of 2007 the PFP still had twenty legislators, 
many of whom had the electoral strength to win in SMDs.  The KMT 
and PFP resolved the problem through negotiations, in which the KMT 
cleared the way by giving PFP legislators a free run in a number of SMDs 
and three party list seats.52  However, the conditions were that these PFP 
politicians would stand as KMT candidates and the PFP would not nomi-
nate a PR list.  Therefore, following the election the PFP was left with 
only a single legislator.  Even though the KMT did not ask the former PFP 
legislators to renounce their membership, once the PFP tried to regain its 
independence, none of its former politicians returned to the fold.
Therefore, the interrelationship between the KMT and PFP was criti-
cal in the PFP’s decline.  If the PFP had adopted a more independent and 
distinctive policy line and refused to accept the KMT’s conditions for a 
nomination agreement, it is quite likely it could have remained a smaller 
but still relevant party.  In fact the PFP should have known what would 
be the result of this kind of collaboration from the case of the NP in 2004. 
The KMT and NP negotiated a similar agreement in which the NP did not 
nominate a PR list and a number of NP politicians were nominated under 
a KMT banner.  There was only one winner here as the agreement essen-
tially allowed the KMT to poach some of the NP’s best known politicians 
such as Lai Shyh-Bao (賴士葆) and Fai Alex Hrong-Tai (費鴻泰).  In 
both cases, these former NP and PFP politicians once elected had effec-
tively been annexed by the KMT.
Thus, if we consider Meguid’s framework, the mainstream party 
(KMT) was adopting an accommodative stance towards the small party 
both in terms of issues but also nomination.  However, as Spoon has 
shown, small parties agency can also be critical to their fortunes and 
therefore the PFP’s demise was not inevitable.  If the PFP had nominated 
51For instance in January 2006 one of the most popular PFP legislators Diane Lee (李慶安) 
defected to the KMT.  See Mo Yan-chih, “Lee Leaves PFP to Rejoin KMT,” Taipei Times, 
January 15, 2006, 3.
52In addition, in some districts informal survey based primaries were used to choose be-
tween the registered KMT candidate and an incumbent PFP.  This method was used in 
Kaohsiung City District 1.
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its own set of candidates in 2008, it might have remained a relevant party. 
By accepting the KMT’s terms’ for nomination agreements, the PFP and 
NP allowed their legislators to be annexed by the KMT.  The PFP’s strate-
gic mistakes meant that it sacrificed its party identity as well as electoral 
prospects.
The impact of the DPP-TSU relationship on the TSU’s decline 
showed similarities and differences from the case of the pan Blue splin-
ters.  After being formed, the TSU tried to stake out a more extreme posi-
tion than the DPP on the national identity spectrum.  Thus it was more like 
the NP in being a purifier, rather than the purifier light stances employed 
by the PFP.  The TSU also worked closely with the DPP both in parlia-
ment and in the SMD local executive and 2004 presidential campaigns. 
The TSU was at least until 2006 more successful at maintaining its own 
party identity and this may explain why it actually maintained its vote and 
seat shares in the 2004 and 2005 elections, in contrast to the decline seen 
on the part of the PFP.  However, in 2008 it suffered the same fate as the 
PFP, being wiped out in the Legislative Yuan.  However, the process and 
relationship with its partner mainstream party was slightly different.
The decline of the TSU became more apparent later than that of the 
PFP, particularly in the final two years of the second DPP term.  A first 
variable was ideology, which was more significant due to the greater em-
phasis on ideology on the part of the TSU.  The initially relatively moder-
ate cross-Strait and national identity approach of the DPP under Chen left 
space for the TSU to develop its appeal to those on the pro-independence 
side of the identity spectrum.  However, Chen’s announcement of the 
abolition of the National Unification Council and Guidelines in 2006 rep-
resented the start of a series of DPP appeals into formerly TSU issue ter-
ritory.53  Public opinion increasingly viewed the DPP as becoming more 
radical in these last two years and thus squeezed the space for the TSU.54 
53Hsiao-Chi Hsu, “Domestic Vulnerability and Nationalist Propaganda: Taiwan’s National 
Unification Council Campaign in 2006,” Issues & Studies 46, no. 4 (December 2010): 37- 
72.
54This was confirmed in opinion polls showing that the DPP was viewed as more radical than 
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In Meguid’s terms, the DPP had adopted an accommodative strategy 
which seriously undermined the TSU’s ownership of the Taiwan indepen-
dence issue.  Of course the TSU was aware of this challenge and thus did 
attempt in 2008 to combine its anti-China approach with new appeals that 
showed its distinctiveness.  For instance, Lee once again became promi-
nent in its TV ads and it attempted to appeal to new niche constituencies 
such as students and the disabled.  But it is questionable whether voters 
were convinced by the new image since it came so late in the campaign.
Like the KMT, the DPP welcomed stronger allied party legislators 
to stand under a DPP banner in 2008’s legislative election, particularly 
in districts where it lacked well known politicians.  However, the DPP-
TSU negotiations over nomination were far less harmonious than those 
between the KMT and PFP.  For instance, the DPP did not offer the TSU 
seats on its PR list or in winnable district seats.  In one of the two districts 
the DPP left open for the TSU, its candidate only gained 11 percent in 
Taipei County District 9.  Thus in return for supporting the DPP’s presi-
dential candidate the TSU received nothing substantial.  These failed 
negotiations meant that the TSU felt forced to compete with the DPP in 
both the district and PR list legislative contests.  This competition served 
to undermine both parties in the actual campaign.  At this point though the 
TSU had much less scope for agency in controlling its own fate compared 
to the PFP, as its legislators had tended to rely on party image more than 
the PFP politicians.
The TSU’s bid for independence from the DPP at the last minute 
shows parallels with the NP in 2008.  Although the NP did not nominate 
at the district level, it did try to compete with the KMT at the PR level in 
2008.  Its campaign stressed the NP’s unwavering commitment to the Re-
public of China and opposition to Taiwan independence.55  Nevertheless, 
this attempt to regain its foothold in parliament also failed as the party fell 
the TSU on the unification versus independence spectrum by 2008.  See Taiwan Election 
and Democratization Study (2008) Legislative Elections, Final Report 2008.
55See NP ad, China Times, January 11, 2008, A16.
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1 percent short of the required 5 percent threshold.  The KMT’s swing to 
the right after 2005 and its earlier poaching of the NP’s electoral stars un-
dermined the NP’s campaign.56
Meguid’s framework is thus more useful for explaining the demise 
of both the TSU and the NP.  The mainstream parties’ swings into the 
smaller parties’ ideological space represent an accommodative approach 
that allowed the mainstream party to steal the small parties’ core issues. 
Spoon’s agency approach is less useful in this case as both the TSU and 
NP, however, lacked the kind of human resources of the PFP.
The decline in the small parties’ electoral fortunes continued after 
2008 as all three splinter parties struggled to recover from their elimina-
tion from the Legislative Yuan.  This continued decline is visible from the 
drop in their vote and seat shares in the 2010 Kaohsiung and Taipei city 
council elections.  In fact, the only small party that bucked the downward 
trend was the GP, which increased its vote share in Taipei from 0.4 to 1 
percent.  In contrast to the accommodative (regarding policy) and preda-
tory mainstream nomination strategies towards small parties seen in the 
second DPP term, in the first two years of the Ma administration the main 
parties took a dismissive attitude towards the smaller parties.
Explaining the Revival of Small Parties in 2012
There are two challenges for understanding 2012.  The first is to 
explain why the PFP, TSU and GP all performed well despite the unfavor-
able electoral system.  Secondly, why did the NP fail follow the fellow 
splinter parties in their revival?  In all four cases I argue that Meguid and 
Spoon’s approaches are most useful as their fate was closely connected to 
both mainstream party strategies and their own agency.
56Voters had perceived the KMT as having a position on the right of the national identity 
spectrum since Lee Teng-hui left the party in 2000.  Ma’s comment in a Newsweek inter-
view in late 2005 that the KMT’s ultimate goal is unification reflects how the KMT was 
moving into the NP’s territory.
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Firstly, the NP was the one party not following the growth trend. 
During the first Ma term the NP’s chairman Yu Mu-ming (郁慕明) re-
mained active in China-Taiwan relations.  The party however, was put 
into an awkward position as many of its core policy demands were being 
put into practice by the KMT in the field of closer economic integration 
with China.57  This left the NP highly reliant on the unpopular position of 
supporting unification.  In the run up to the 2012 elections the NP came 
out strongly in support of the KMT’s presidential candidate but was not 
seen as being worthy of the KMT offering it any support on the PR list. 
In other words, the KMT squeezed the NP’s space by taking an accom-
modative approach on policy and a dismissive one on nomination.  The 
NP did attempt to stake out a new issue stance but there were not enough 
votes at such an extreme pro-unification position in the electoral market.
It is rather ironic that the TSU actually benefitted from its elimina-
tion from the Legislative Yuan in 2008.  This enabled it to break free 
from its alliance with the DPP and develop its own policy image.  In 
the aftermath of the DPP’s defeat of 2008, the DPP attempted to appear 
more moderate on China, which gave the TSU space again to develop 
on that policy area.  Although both opposed the ECFA trade agreement 
with China, it was the TSU that was most vocal and consistent in its op-
position.  This was particularly clear in its repeated attempts to promote a 
national referendum on ECFA.58  These referendum drives were frustrated 
by the KMT dominated referendum review committee, but they gained 
the TSU significant media attention.59  Once the ECFA had been passed 
the DPP opposition became more lukewarm, further expanding the TSU’s 
space to dominate the issue area.  For instance, the DPP attempted to 
steer the campaign agenda 2012 away from cross-Strait relations.  Thus 
in Meguid’s terms the TSU benefitted from the DPP’s increasing lack of 
57The NP had proposed closer economic integration along the lines of the 2010 ECFA agree- 
ment since the mid 1990s.
58Rich Chang, “TSU Launches ECFA Referendum,” Taipei Times, March 15, 2010, 3.
59Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Committee Votes against TSU Referendum Proposal,” Taipei Times, 
December 28, 2011, 1.
ISSUES & STUDIES
180 March 2014
interest (dismissive) and the KMT’s adversarial approach in promoting 
economic and political integration with China.
Nevertheless, this TSU policy niche alone would probably not have 
been sufficient to get over the challenging five percent threshold to gain 
parliamentary seats in 2012.  Its collaborative nomination agreement with 
the DPP this time was much more successful than that of 2008.  This time 
the TSU (and Lee Teng-hui) openly supported the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen (蔡
英文), and it did not nominate at the district level, concentrating instead 
on the party list level.  Thus the TSU attempted to convince voters that 
the DPP was willing to sacrifice some PR votes in exchange for the TSU’s 
support for Tsai.  For instance, one newspaper ad in the final week of the 
campaign showed images of Lee Teng-hui, TSU chair Huang Kun-huei 
(黃崑輝) and Tsai Ing-wen.60  It called on voters to vote for either the 
TSU or DPP on the PR party vote and DPP for the president and district 
legislator.  What is interesting here is that the TSU had fewer bargaining 
chips as it was on paper far weaker than four years earlier, but it success-
fully negotiated a more balanced agreement.  As the election was so close 
in 2012, the DPP needed Lee Teng-hui’s endorsement of Tsai in the final 
week of the campaign.  Apart from the fact that the TSU gained three 
seats with its 9 percent PR vote, we can see the effect from the fact that 
though the DPP’s presidential vote rose from 41.5 to 45.6 percent, its par-
liamentary PR vote actually declined from 36.9 to 34.6 percent.
The PFP was technically in a slightly more healthy state than the 
TSU after the 2008 elections.  It had one legislator and a number of its city 
councilors had not defected.  However, its sole legislator Lin Cheng-er 
(林正二) was disqualified for vote buying in 2010 and the PFP’s seat and 
vote share continued to be eroded in the 2010 local elections.
Unlike in 2008, neither the KMT nor the PFP were prepared to co-
operate over nomination in 2012.  The PFP had clearly learned from its 
2008 experience of being virtually annexed by the KMT.  Similarly the 
KMT believed it no longer needed to worry about the PFP in SMDs as it 
60Liberty Times, January 10, 2012, A7.
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had lost most of its strongest politicians in 2008.  A sign of the tensions 
between the two parties was the long running legal case taken out by 
KMT secretary general King Pu-tsong (金溥聰) against Soong over his 
accusation that King had faked opinion surveys to undermine Soong’s 
campaign in 2000.61  Some preliminary talks were held but these broke 
down without any agreements on nomination.62
In the run up to the 2012 election, the PFP tried to take a distinctive 
approach on both issue strategy and nomination.  On issues it was critical 
of both mainstream parties.  For instance, its ads criticized the blue green 
divide and the damaging consequences for Taiwan.63  However, the PFP 
devoted greater attention to criticizing the performance of the KMT ad-
ministration.  A prime example of this was PFP legislative candidate Liu 
Wen-hsiung’s (劉文雄) regular appearances on politics talk shows where 
he joined Pan Green speakers in attacking Ma.  Liu’s attacks often ques-
tioned the integrity of Ma’s campaign funding, leading the KMT to take 
out a defamation case against Liu.  The PFP strategy was targeted at light 
Blue supporters or non partisans who were dissatisfied with the Ma gov-
ernment performance.  This approach seemed to be working as for much 
of the campaign Soong was competitive with the main candidates among 
non-partisan voters.64
In contrast to 2008, the PFP adopted a highly independent and ad-
versarial nomination policy in 2012 towards the KMT.  It not only nomi-
nated a PR list and district legislators, but its chairman James Soong also 
stood for the presidency.65  Although Soong could not match his popular-
ity in 1999-2000, his presidential campaign did serve to boost not only his 
own support levels but also the PFP.  The strategy had the potential to be 
61Mo Yan-chih, “PFP-KMT Animosity Appears to Deepen,” Taipei Times, July 6, 2011, 1.
62Mo Yan-chih, “PFP Wants Action Before Ma-Soong Meet,” Taipei Times, June 29, 2011, 
3.
63See PFP ad, Liberty Times, January 7, 2012, A1.
64It was only in the final six weeks that Soong’s support levels collapsed.  See TVBS Poll 
Center, “Survey Two Days before the 2012 Presidential Election,” http://www1.tvbs.com 
.tw/tvbs2011/pch/tvbs_poll_center.aspx.
65It should be noted though that Soong stood as an independent rather than a PFP candidate.
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highly threatening to the KMT as polls had shown Tsai close to Ma and 
at least initially Soong had a support rate of about 15 percent.  Even in 
the district races, the PFP tended to nominate candidates in districts with 
KMT incumbents, thus again threatening to split the pro KMT vote and 
allow the DPP to benefit.  In the run up to the election Soong’s support 
rate began to decline and eventually he only received 2.7 percent.  How-
ever, the overall strategy worked, but only just.  The main objective of the 
presidential campaign was the raise the visibility of the PFP’s PR (and to 
a lesser extent its district) candidates.  The PFP’s 5.5 percent in the PR 
list was higher than Soong’s presidential vote, and enough to allow two 
PFP legislators on the PR list to be elected.  In addition, Lin Cheng-er 
was again elected for the PFP in the Plains Aboriginal District, leaving the 
party with three legislators.
In the case of the PFP then, Spoon’s agency approach has greater 
explanatory value.  Despite the KMT’s largely dismissive attitude towards 
its former ally, the PFP was able to develop its own niche appeal and 
adversarial nomination strategy that enabled it to just pass the 5 percent 
threshold required for PR seats.
Finally we have the case of the GP, which though not winning any 
seats won its best ever vote share (1.7 percent) and even beat the NP to 
come fifth in the PR vote.  With a lack of human and financial resources 
the GP on its own has only limited agency to affect its election outcome. 
However, as with the TSU and PFP it benefitted from its changed rela-
tionship with the main parties.
Under the DPP administration the environmental movement had 
faced a dilemma as the DPP is generally viewed as a more pro-environ-
ment and anti-nuclear party.  Moreover, the DPP both invited a number 
of environmental leaders to serve in its cabinets and it also gave environ-
mentalists greater access to the policy making process.66  Nevertheless, 
the DPP increasingly compromised with big business in order to deal with 
66For more on the DPP’s relationship with the environmental movement see Arrigo and 
Puleston, “The Environmental Movement after 2000,” 176-80.
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a sluggish economy, causing the environmental movement to become 
increasingly disillusioned with the DPP.  Thus the GP began to reemerge 
in the final years of the DPP era as an independent force.  We can see this 
in the way that, after being largely dormant for the first five years of the 
DPP era, the GP once again nominated candidates both in the 2006 Taipei 
city council and 2008 legislative elections.
In the first Ma Ying-jeou term Taiwan’s environmental movement 
showed a major revival and the GP has been one of the beneficiaries of 
this development.67  The KMT took a clear policy of promoting economic 
growth and continued to develop its nuclear energy policy.  This was 
evident in its initial strong support for the planned Kuokuang Petrochemi-
cal plant in Changhua and continued construction of the Fourth Nuclear 
Power Station.  The DPP tended to oppose these projects but was rather 
marginal in these protests, partly as a result of its government record and 
desire not to gain an anti-business image.  Although initially the KMT 
strongly supported the Kuokuang plant, the strong protest movement 
meant that even the KMT felt it needed to abandon it in the run up to the 
2012 presidential elections.68  The Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 
2011 also helped raise the salience of the environmental issues and the 
visibility of the GP.  Thus in the run up to the 2012 elections the GP faced 
the combination of a DPP taking a low key approach to environmental 
issues and the KMT taking an economic growth first adversarial ap-
proach.  As Meguid suggests, this ought to raise the salience of the GP’s 
issue and promote its issue ownership.
The GP also benefitted to a certain extent from an unofficial cooper-
ation agreement with the DPP.  In Taipei City District 7 the GP candidate 
Pan Han-shen (潘翰聲) reached an agreement with the DPP that in return 
for giving the GP a free run against the KMT and DPP local support, Pan 
67The sense of a resurgence in social movement activism is present in publications such 
as H. H. Michael Hsiao and Ku Chung-hua, eds., Taiwan shehui yundong zai chufa (The 
revival of Taiwan’s social movements) (Taipei: Chuliu, 2010).
68Shelley Shan and Mo Yan-chih, “Taskforce Equivocates on Naphtha Plant,” Taipei Times, 
April 23, 2011, 1.
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would support the DPP’s presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen.  This agree-
ment created considerable controversy within the GP, as it had not been a 
party to party agreement.69  However, it gave the GP’s Pan national media 
coverage in a way unprecedented for the party and expert campaign assis-
tance.  Pan’s 24 percent was the highest vote share ever achieved by a GP 
candidate and made him the GP’s first well known figure.
Conclusions and Future Prospects for Small Parties
This paper has examined the fluctuating fortunes of Taiwan’s small 
parties since 2004.  It shows that institutional variables alone are insuf-
ficient to explain the impact of these actors.  Instead I argue that the re-
lationship between the dominant mainstream parties and smaller parties 
is critical in understanding the space for smaller parties.  The paper finds 
support for Meguid’s argument that the strategies adopted by mainstream 
parties towards small parties plays a major role in their impact.  In addi-
tion, as Spoon suggests, the Taiwan case reveals how small parties can 
also shape their own fate by getting a balance between party ideals and the 
goal of electoral success.  In other words, small parties can also persevere 
in an unfavorable political environment with independent issue strategies. 
Moreover, one of the key findings in this study has been the importance 
of nomination negotiations between mainstream and small parties.  Fa-
vorable agreements can offer small parties the chance to remain relevant, 
while predatory nomination agreements can result in small parties’ virtual 
elimination.
So what are the prospects for Taiwan’s small parties?  This will depend 
upon how they build on the progress made in the 2012 campaign and 
develop their party images.  The debates over the Fourth Nuclear refer-
endum should raise the salience of environmental issues and thus present 
69In recent interviews with Green Party activists this author found approximately half of 
respondents highly critical of this unofficial agreement.
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an unprecedented window of opportunity for the GP to expand its support 
base.  The PFP and TSU have also had the chance to gain support and re-
mould their party image with their return to the Legislative Yuan in 2012. 
Overall the TSU appears to have been more successful as it has continued 
to focus on its anti China integration message.  The PFP by contrast has 
struggled in developing a distinct party image.
The next major test for the small parties will be the 2014 local elec-
tions.  These present an opportunity for the small parties to expand their 
representation.  Firstly, the city and council elections are conducted under 
the MMD electoral system which of course operates in a semi-proportional 
manner.  Secondly, the SMD executive elections offer the small parties 
the possibility of negotiating nomination agreements with the main parties. 
Although a more favorable political environment does not guarantee small 
party success, the prospects for a diverse party system are more promising 
than the small parties’ nadir of 2010.
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